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Abstract. In Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET), various types of Denial of 
Service Attacks (DoS) are possible because of the inherent limitations of its 
routing protocols. Considering the Ad hoc On Demand Vector (AODV) routing 
protocol as the base protocol it is possible to find a suitable solution to over-
come the attack of initiating / forwarding fake Route Requests (RREQs) that 
lead to hogging of network resources and hence denial of service to genuine 
nodes. In this paper, a proactive scheme is proposed that could prevent a spe-
cific kind of DoS attack and identify the misbehaving node. Since the proposed 
scheme is distributed in nature it has the capability to prevent Distributed DoS 
(DDoS) as well. The performance of the proposed algorithm in a series of simu-
lations reveal that the proposed scheme provides a better solution than existing 
approaches with no extra overhead. 
1   Introduction 
In an ad hoc wireless network where wired infrastructures are not feasible, 
energy and bandwidth conversation are the two key elements presenting re-
search challenges. Limited bandwidth makes a network easily congested by 
control signals of the routing protocol. Routing schemes developed for wired 
networks seldom consider restrictions of this type. Instead, they assume that 
the network is mostly stable and the overhead for routing messages is negli-
gible. Considering these differences between wired and wireless network, it is 
necessary to develop a wireless routing protocol that restricts congestion in 
the network [1][2][3][4][5][6]. 
This paper proposes minor modifications to the existing AODV routing 
protocol (RFC 3561) in order to restrict congestion in the network during a 
particular type of DoS attack. In addition to this it incurs absolutely no extra 
overhead [7]. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
describe the DoS attack caused due to RREQ flooding and its implications on 
the existing AODV driven MANET [8][9]. To combat this DoS attack a pro-
active [10] scheme is proposed in section 3. Section 4 presents an illustration 
to describe the implications of RREQ flooding on pure AODV and the modi-
fied AODV. To quantify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, a DoS 
[11] attack was simulated in the mobile environment and its performance 
results are reported in section 5. Finally section 6 gives the conclusion and 
further work. 
2. DoS Attack Due to RREQ Flooding 
In AODV, a malicious node can override the restriction put by 
RREQ_RATELIMIT [12] (limit of initiating / forwarding RREQs) by increas-
ing it or disabling it. A node can do so because of its self-control over its 
parameters. The default value for the RREQ_RATELIMIT is 10 as proposed 
by RFC 3561. A compromised node may choose to set the value of parameter 
RREQ_RATELIMIT to a very high number. This allows it to flood the net-
work with fake RREQs [12] and lead to a kind of DoS attack. In this type of 
DoS attack a non-malicious node cannot fairly serve other nodes due to the 
network-load imposed by the fake RREQs. This leads to the following prob-
lems:  
• Wastage of bandwidth 
• Wastage of nodes’ processing time (more overhead) 
• Exhaustion of the network resources like memory (routing table en-
tries) 
• Exhaustion of the node’s battery power 
This further results in degraded throughput. Most of the network resources 
are wasted in trying to generate routes to destinations that do not exist or 
routes that are not going to be used for any communication. This implies that 
the existing version of AODV is vulnerable to such type of malicious behav-
ior from an internal node (which is then termed as a compromised node). 
3. Proposed Scheme  
3.1. Overview 
As mentioned earlier, the default value for RREQ_RATELIMIT is 10 
RREQs/sec. This means each node is expected to observe some self-control 
on the number of RREQs it sends in one sec. A compromised node may 
choose to set the value of parameter RREQ_RATELIMIT to a very high num-
ber or even disable this limiting feature, thus allowing it to send large number 
of RREQ packets per second. The proposed scheme shifts the responsibility 
to monitor this parameter on the node’s neighbor, thus ensuring the compli-
ance of this restriction. This solves all of the problems (mentioned in section 
2) caused due to flooding of RREQs from a compromised node. Thus instead 
of self-control, the control exercised by a node’s neighbor results in prevent-
ing the flooding of RREQs. 
3.2. RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT and RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT 
The proposal is based on the application of two parameters: 
RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT and RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT. 
RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT denotes the number of RREQs that can be accepted 
and processed per unit time by a node. The purpose of this parameter is to 
specify a value that ensures uniform usage of a node's resources by its 
neighbors. RREQs exceeding this limit are dropped, but their timestamps are 
recorded. This information will aid in monitoring the neighbor's activities. In 
the simulations carried out, the value of this parameter was kept as three (i.e. 
three RREQs can be accepted per unit time). This value can be made adap-
tive, depending upon node metrics such as it memory, processing power, bat-
tery, etc. 
The RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT parameter is used to specify a value that 
aids in determining whether a node is acting malicious or not. To do so, the 
number of RREQs originated/forwarded by a neighboring node per unit time 
is tracked. If this count exceeds the value of RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT, one 
can safely assume that the corresponding neighboring node is trying to flood 
the network with possibly fake RREQs. On identifying a neighboring node as 
malicious, it will be blacklisted. This will prevent further flooding of the fake 
RREQs in the network. The blacklisted node is ignored for a period of time 
given by BLACKLIST_TIMEOUT after which it is unblocked. The proposed 
scheme has the ability to block a node till BLACKLIST_TIMEOUT period on 
an incremental basis. The BLACKLIST_TIMEOUT period is doubled each 
time the node repeats its malicious behavior.  
In the simulations the value of RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT is kept as 10 (i.e. more 
than 10 RREQs per unit time results in flooding activity). By blacklisting a malicious 
node, all neighbors of the malicious node restrict the RREQ flooding. Also the mali-
cious node is isolated due to this distributed defense and so cannot hog its neighbor’s 
resources. The neighboring nodes are therefore free to entertain the RREQs from 
other genuine nodes. Nodes that are confident about the malicious nature of a particu-
lar node, can avoid using it for subsequent network functions. In this way genuine 
nodes are saved from experiencing the DoS attack. 
3.3. Advantages of the Proposed Scheme 
• The proposed scheme incurs no extra overhead, as it makes minimal 
modifications to the existing data structures and functions related to 
blacklisting a node in the existing version of pure AODV (RFC 
3561).  
• Also the proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of its resultant 
routes established, resource reservations and its computational com-
plexity.  
• If more than one malicious node collaborate, they in turn will be re-
stricted and isolated by their neighbors, since they monitor and exer-
cise control over forwarding RREQs by nodes. Thus the scheme suc-
cessfully prevents DDoS attacks. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration in original AODV 
4. Algorithm Illustration 
Figure 1 depicts the working in pure AODV routing protocol when an in-
ternal malicious node launches a  DoS attack by flooding the network with 
RREQs. The black node depicts the malicious node and the blue nodes depict 
two genuine nodes that want to communicate with each other. The optimal 
route consists of four intermediate nodes including the malicious node and 
three of its neighbors. The malicious node floods the network by generating 
10 RREQs per second as shown. Its immediate neighbors, (who are not mali-
cious) observe the RREQ_RATELIMIT and hence each forward 10 RREQs 
only. Since at max three RREQs will be accepted from these nodes within 
one second, the neighbors of these nodes need to forward < seven RREQs and 
their neighbors in turn need to forward < four RREQs, as shown. Since the 
resources of the malicious node’s neighbors are completely occupied in proc-
essing and forwarding the RREQ’s originating from it, the route between the 
blue nodes, if it is established, will consist of greater number of intermediate 
nodes. Thus in effect a DoS attack is launched as the genuine nodes are de-
prived of the services of nodes whose resources are wasted due to flooding. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the proposed AODV 
Figure 2 illustrates the working procedure in the proposed AODV scheme. 
As shown in the figure, malicious node (depicted by the black node) floods 
RREQs in the network and two genuine nodes (depicted by blue nodes) want 
to communicate with each other. In this scheme, the no. of RREQs that can be 
accepted from a neighbor is limited. Hence, the neighbors of the malicious 
node, will only accept and forward three RREQ packets received from it 
within a time interval of one sec. This rate limit of three packets is to ensure 
fair share of a node’s resources to all the neighbors. Moreover, whenever the 
malicious node crosses the RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT of 10 RREQ pack-
ets within a time interval of one sec, its neighbors will blacklist it. Thus, in 
addition to limiting the clogging up of resources in the network, the proposed 
scheme also, isolates the malicious node. The route established in this scheme 
is expected to be the optimum route, which consists of minimum number of 
intermediate nodes. Thus, no DoS attack is experienced in the developed 
scheme. 
5.  Simulation/Experiments and Analysis 
NS-2 simulator is used [13][14] for the implementation of the proposed 
scheme. The IEEE 802.11 [15] protocol is used for the MAC layer. The 
AODV protocol incorporated in NS-2 by Uppsala University, Sweden, was 
used as the base protocol. Modifications were made to this version of AODV 
protocol that confirms to RFC 3561. TCP was used as the transport protocol 
Radio transmission range is set as 250 meters. Traffic sources used are Con-
stant-Bit-Rate (CBR) and the field configuration is 2000 x 2000m with 69 
nodes. 
5.1. Traffic Scenario 
Node 0 is configured as the malicious node. It starts flooding the network 
with fake RREQ’s at simulated time of one sec till time 17 secs. The traffic 
was generated such that the source and destination pairs are randomly spread 
over the entire network. The other source-destination pairs are shown in Ta-
ble 1. 
 
Table 1. Traffic generation summary 
 
Source Destination Simulation time 
Node 48 Node 20 11-16 sec 
Node 18 Node 27 5-12 sec 
Node 31 Node 66 6-11 sec 
Node 45 Node 16 9-12 sec 
The performance evaluation of the proposed detection scheme involves 
study of two different aspects: 
• Performance of original AODV protocol in presence of compromised 
nodes. 
• Performance of proposed AODV protocol in presence of compromised 
nodes. 
Each simulation was carried out for 17.2 seconds. The results for both 
cases have been observed. The following section gives the parameters that 
were measured for both the original and the modified protocols. 
5.2. Network Simulation Metrics 
The metrics are the important determinants of network performance, which 
have been used to compare the performance of the proposed scheme in the 
network with the performance of the original protocol. This study has been 
done to show that the proposed scheme enhances the security of the routing 
protocol without causing substantial degradation in network performance. 
1) End-to-End Delay: Average time difference (in seconds) between the 
time of the packet receipt at the destination node, and the packet sending 
time at the source node. 
2) Round Trip Time (RTT): Time difference between the receipt of the 
acknowledgement from the destination node to the source node, and the 
time of sending of the original packet at the source node. 
3) Average simulation processing time at nodes for a packet: Time dif-
ference between the packet forwarding time and the packet receipt time 
at a given node. 
4) Average number of nodes receiving packets: Sum of numbers of all 
the intermediate nodes (nodes between source and destination nodes) re-
ceiving packets sent by all the source nodes / number of received packets 
at all the destination nodes. 
5) Average number of nodes forwarding packets: Sum of numbers of all 
the intermediate nodes (nodes between source and destination nodes) 
forwarding packets sent by all the source nodes / number of received 
packets at all the destination nodes. 
6) Delays between current and other node: Shows end-to-end delays (in 
seconds) between current node (sender) and other node (receiver) 
7) Number of data packets dropped: The number of data packets dropped 
at any given node. This is an important parameter because if the number 
of dropped packets increases, the throughput would decrease. 
8) Throughput: It is sum of sizes (bits), or number (packets) of gener-
ated/sent/forwarded/received packets, calculated at every time interval 
and divided by its length. Throughput (bits) is shown in bits. Throughput 
(packets) shows numbers of packets in every time interval. Time interval 
length is equal to one second by default.  
5.3. Performance Evaluation  
This section consists of the results for the test cases. The recorded values 
are obtained by averaging over three runs for each test case.  
Acknowledgement packet receive time v/s RTT 
As simulation time increases the network resources available to the nodes 
vary. The availability of network resources is one of the parameter, which 
helps in deciding the RTT. Figure 3 shows the Graph of Acknowledgment 
Packet receive time versus RTT. 
 
Figure 3: Acknowledgement packet receive time versus round trip time 
It is evident from Figure 3 that as time proceeds; RTT is lesser in the pro-
posed AODV scheme, as compared to the original scheme. This is because of 
the limit imposed on the number of RREQ packets being flooded in the net-
work by malicious node and less number of intermediate nodes in the routes 
between genuine nodes.  
Dropped Packet Sum: 
The number of Packets dropped at a given instance of time in the simula-
tion run determines the efficiency of the protocol. Figure 4, accommodates 
the information regarding the number of dropped packets throughout the 
simulation.  
From figure 4, it is found that overall, the number of packets dropped using 
the proposed scheme is lesser than the number of packets dropped when using 
the original scheme. In the initial stages, the large amount of drops in the 
original scheme is due to the fact that the Flooding of RREQ in the network 
causes congestion, and the route formation for genuine requests is delayed. 
Thus, the buffered data packets are timed out and dropped. During the later 
stages the unavailability of network resources causes the data packets to be 
dropped. The improvement in the proposed scheme is due to the fact that 
there exists optimum utilization of the network resources and there is no over-
load, leading to comparatively lesser packet drops. 
 
Figure 4: Throughput of dropping packets 
End-to-End Delay v/s Packet Size 
Figure 5 depicts how the proposed method affects the end-to-end delay. 
This is the average delay of all data packets.  
 
Figure 5: Packet size versus average end-to-end delay 
The delay in case of both data and AODV packets in case of the proposed 
scheme is lesser compared to the original AODV 
Throughput of generating packets at an intermediate node in the route 
The following graph shows throughput of generating packets at an inter-
mediate node (numbered 48 in the sample simulation scenario) vs simulation 
time in seconds. The graph reflects the simulation time for which an interme-
diate node in the route generated packets in original AODV as compared to 
proposed AODV. In other words, it depicts how long the route through the 
intermediate node was valid during simulation. 
 
Figure 6. Throughput of generating packets at node 48 
 
Figure 7. Average simulation processing time 
In the scenario with original AODV protocol, the routes become invalid 
quickly when no replies (ACKs) for data packets are received due to clogging 
of network resources and the DoS attack. This is reflected in the graph by 
having > 0 throughput of generating packets for only two seconds of simula-
tion time, after which, the route through the intermediate node 48 becomes 
invalid and hence resulting in 0 throughput of generating packets. However, 
in the scenario with the proposed AODV, the route through node 48 remains 
valid for longer period of simulation time and hence it has > 0 throughput of 
generating packets till simulation time 7 seconds (shown by blue line in the 
graph). Thus, it can be inferred from the graph that routes remain valid for 
longer periods of time under the proposed scheme. 
Packet size versus simulation time 
The comparison of simulation processing times as illustrated in Figure 6 
reveals that the proposed scheme incurs no additional overhead as compared 
to the original scheme. 
Table 2. Overall network simulation results 
 Original AODV Proposed AODV 
Average End-to-end delay [sec] 0.32539 0.27576 
Receiving packets 0.4356328083 0.3580786026 
Forwarding packets 0.4285714286 0.3499688085 
Average RTT 0.58819 0.45346 
Network information for sample scenario 
Table 2 gives the comparative study of network information for original 
AODV and proposed AODV. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
The DoS attack caused due to RREQ flooding in ad hoc network can be 
successfully detected in the proposed scheme. The scheme can accurately 
detect the malicious nodes in the network. The malicious nodes identified are 
blacklisted and none of the genuine nodes in the network are wrongly accused 
of misbehaving. In the proposed scheme, there is an enhancement in the per-
formance of the network in presence of compromised nodes. 
Mobile computing and communication is an upcoming field, which is cap-
turing the imagination of all the researchers worldwide. Thus the scope of 
enhancements and improvements is enormous. An immediate enhancement 
can be making the limit-parameters adaptive in nature. This can be done by 
making calculations based on parameters like memory, processing capability, 
battery power, and average number of requests per second in the network and 
so on. Further, the protocol can be made secure against other types of possi-
ble DoS attacks that threaten it.  
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NOTE:  
AODV_modifications.zip 
<http://www.tifr.res.in/~sanyal/papers/AODV_modifications.zip> contains all associated codes 
and its possible explanation. This has been added to provide some help to students and re-
searchers who could interested in implementation issues. Please note that this is added with the 
best effort basis. On-line email help is not easily possible to provide.  
 
